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ABSTRACT: William M. Ramsey’s Representation Reconsidered (Cambridge University 5 
Press, New York, 2007) is a critical evaluation of the use of representational notions in 6 
cognitive science. Ramsey distinguishes different types of representational posits and 7 
argues that only one of them, the sort of structured representation that is assumed in the 8 
computational theory of mind, remains true to representationalism. Other uses of 9 
“representation” are more akin to the concepts of receptor, transduction, or causal 10 
mediation, and do not entail any actual representational role. In recent times, the increasing 11 
use of representational notions of the latter kind leads Ramsey to suspect that under the 12 
cover of its representational umbrella, cognitive science is actually moving back to 13 
behaviorism. Regardless of its conclusions, Ramsey’s book is highly readable, 14 
philosophically careful, and provocative. It uncovers widespread ambiguity and confusion 15 
in cognitive science. By Ramsey’s own analysis, however, it is the validity of all concepts 16 
of internal representation, not just some of them, that can be questioned. Whatever 17 
scientific truths lurk behind the representational narrative, they are best uncovered and 18 
characterized without appealing to any concept of representation. 19 
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 21 
If one thing is to stand for or to represent another we must have direct 22 
knowledge both of the thing represented and of the symbol.  23 
(Nunn, 1909-1910, p. 198) 24 
 25 
In Representation Reconsidered, William Ramsey (2007) examines different 26 
notions of representation currently in use among cognitive scientists. His 27 
perspective is that of a philosopher of science. Through conceptual analysis, he 28 
argues that in current cognitive science, the label “representation” hides a variety 29 
of notions, and that some of them have more in common with behaviorism than 30 
what cognitive scientists may be willing to acknowledge. 31 
Ramsey’s argument is part of a growing turmoil in cognitive science about the 32 
concept of representation and its applicability to natural and artificial systems. 33 
Cognitive science was organized historically around the joint concepts of 34 
representation and computation (Pylyshyn, 1984). As the discipline evolved, 35 
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however, new contenders to psychological explanation such as connectionism (e.g., 36 
Smolensky, 1988), dynamicism (e.g., Port & van Gelder, 1995), and radical 37 
embodiment (e.g., Chemero, 2009) have challenged the orthodox conception of the 38 
mind as a representational system. One such challenge was offered by van Gelder 39 
(1995), who suggested, using the Watt governor as an example of a machine 40 
devoid of representations, that cognition was more akin to a nonrepresentational 41 
dynamical system than to a digital computer. Van Gelder’s proposal was met with a 42 
number of objections from defenders of the representational standpoint. Bechtel 43 
(1998), in particular, argued that the functioning of the Watt governor actually 44 
involved representations. For example, Bechtel claimed that in the Watt governor 45 
the angle of the arms represented the speed of the flywheel. 46 
The most likely explanation for the divergence of views between van Gelder 47 
(1995) and Bechtel (1998) is that contrasting conceptions of representation were at 48 
work. The lack of resolution in this debate has important implications for cognitive 49 
science, however. As Haselager, de Groot, and van Rappard (2003) explain: 50 
Cognitive science can no longer tolerate a situation in which its core concepts 51 
allow extremely conflicting positions on whether or not a relatively simple 52 
system like the Watt Governor is representational. In our view, the value of these 53 
recent debates consists in emphasizing the need for a more stringent definition 54 
of representation and computation. (p. 21) 55 
The main purpose of Ramsey’s book is to fulfill this need. His is not the first 56 
attempt at clarifying the meanings of “representation” at work in cognitive science, 57 
but Representation Reconsidered is the most careful, extensive, and detailed so far. 58 
Reconsidering Representation 59 
Most philosophical work on representations has focused on representational 60 
content. A representation such as the picture of a rabbit is always a representation 61 
of something (its content; in this case a rabbit), and the issue of representational 62 
content is to explain how representations come to have the content that they have. 63 
Ramsey, however, focuses on another question: What kinds of properties does a 64 
thing need to have in order to be a representation?  65 
This question is both important and troubling. On the one hand, the neural 66 
systems that cognitive scientists assume are representational are physical systems 67 
and can be described in purely physical terms. So the hypothesis that a cognitive 68 
system functions with representations is never strictly necessary to explain its 69 
functioning (p. 33; here, as elsewhere, page numbers without references pertain to 70 
Ramsey, 2007). On the other hand, with enough laxity in the use of computational 71 
or representational language, anything could be described trivially as relying on 72 
representations (Putnam, 1988). For example, the stomach could be claimed to 73 
“compute” or “represent” mathematical functions on the ground that during 74 
digestion it moves from one state to another and that its state transitions can be 75 
described mathematically (Searle, 1994).  76 
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Thus, if cognitive systems, and only cognitive systems, work by representing, 77 
a proper definition of “representation” needs to be sufficiently weak to allow for 78 
the existence of representations, but not so weak as to imply that representation is 79 
ubiquitous. Perhaps because most cognitive scientists take the existence of mental 80 
representations as an axiom, in Ramsey’s book the second horn of the dilemma 81 
looms larger than the first. Ramsey reviews and criticizes overgeneral definitions 82 
of “representation,” according to which cold beers designate food (p. 9), rocks 83 
know how to roll down a hill (p. 171), and a climber’s blood represents elevation 84 
(p. 145). Not only do overgeneral theories of representation make the concept 85 
scientifically useless, they also belie reality by claiming of what is not a 86 
representation that it is. Ramsey drives the point home with the example of a 87 
theorist who would invoke a pump to account for some biological phenomenon: 88 
Suppose someone offers an account of some organic process, and suppose this 89 
account posits the existence of a structure that is characterized as a 90 
pump. . .when we ask how it is that the structure in question functions as a pump, 91 
we are told that it does so by absorbing some chemical compound, and nothing 92 
more. In this scenario, we would properly complain that the role the structure is 93 
characterized as playing is not the role associated with our ordinary 94 
understanding of a pump. To be a pump, an entity must, in some way, transfer 95 
material from one place to another. What the theory appears to posit is not a 96 
pump, but instead what sounds more like a sponge. (p. 28) 97 
As Ramsey underscores, in these conditions it would not just be useless to 98 
refer to the postulated structure as a “pump.” It would be wrong.  99 
The same argument applies to any theory that posits representations (p. 11). 100 
To qualify as representations, the postulated entities must recognizably function as 101 
representations. This, in turn, requires some connection between the postulated 102 
representations and our ordinary, pre-scientific understanding of representation. 103 
The latter makes room for two classes of representations: (a) the mental ones, such 104 
as sensory states, perceptions, memories, and dream experiences; and (b) the 105 
nonmental ones, such as “linguistic symbols, pictures, drawings, maps, books, 106 
religious icons, traffic signals and signs, tree rings, compass needle positions, 107 
tracks in the snow, hand signals, flashing lights” (p. 20). It is the second class of 108 
examples that ground cognitivist explications of the concept of representation. 109 
Although Ramsey does not say so, a good reason for appealing to examples of the 110 
second kind rather than the first is the hopelessness of clarifying the mental by 111 
appealing to the mental.  112 
By looking at ordinary examples of nonmental representations, then, we 113 
should be able to elucidate the concept of representation and decide whether the 114 
entities postulated in a given theory of cognition qualify or not as representational. 115 
Now, it is widely acknowledged that in the case of a nonmental representation X 116 
(for example, the picture of a rabbit), what makes X into a representation is the 117 
way in which X is used rather than any intrinsic property of X. Ramsey makes the 118 
point simply and elegantly: 119 
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The proverbial driftwood washed up on an uninhabited beach does not, 120 
intuitively, represent anything, even if it happens to spell out the word 121 
“UNINHABITED BEACH” or is arranged in a way that maps a course to a 122 
nearby lake. However, if someone were to come along and use the driftwood as 123 
a type of map, then it would indeed take on a representational role. (p. 23) 124 
In short, nothing qualifies as a representation unless it is used as a 125 
representation—used to symbolize, denote, “refer to,” or “stand for” something 126 
else. However, this constraint on the concept of representation makes it difficult to 127 
see how there could be representations inside a person’s brain, which is where the 128 
representations posited in cognitive science are typically supposed to reside. 129 
External representations like pictures or maps qualify as representations because 130 
we use them as such. Who uses the internal representations postulated in cognitive 131 
theory? And who uses them as representations? 132 
Clearly, unless one postulates a homunculus who uses these representations 133 
for his own representational purposes, the functioning of an internal representation 134 
(what makes it a representation) cannot be exactly identical to the functioning of 135 
an ordinary, external, nonmental representation. At the same time, the hypothesized 136 
functioning of the internal representation must still be recognizably 137 
representational in nature, otherwise the postulated representation would not be a 138 
representation. How these opposing constraints can be met is far from obvious. 139 
Ramsey nevertheless believes that they can be met, and have actually been met in 140 
some cases. More precisely, he believes that some of the representations postulated 141 
in cognitive science are sufficiently similar to ordinary, nonmental representations 142 
to make it true that the postulated entities are actual representations (as when a 143 
biological “pump” actually functions like a pump), whereas in other cases, the 144 
postulated “representations” are not representations at all, as when an alleged 145 
“pump” turns out to function like a sponge.  146 
To Be or Not to Be a Representation 147 
According to Ramsey, two types of “representation” postulated in cognitive 148 
science involve genuine representational functions. Ramsey’s argument for 149 
representations of the first type, which he calls IO-representations (“IO” for 150 
“input–output”), starts from the fact that some of the inputs and outputs of a 151 
cognitive system are conventional representations. For example, when someone is 152 
asked to compute 23 times 57, “23” and “57,” as well as the person’s answering 153 
“1311,” are concrete numerals that represent abstract numerosities. Now a 154 
computational theory of the multiplication process will decompose it in various 155 
subprocesses, for example, a sequence of additions. They will require their own 156 
inputs and outputs, which are counterparts to the “23,” “57,” and “1311” tokens 157 
serving as representations with respect to multiplication as a whole. Ramsey argues 158 
that these internal analogs of queries and replies are representations because “we 159 
recognize that systems doing things like addition, or comparing chess moves, treat 160 
their inputs and outputs as symbols standing for things like numbers or chess game 161 
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scenarios” (p. 74). Later, however, he expresses doubts as to whether IO-162 
representations actually play a representational role or merely seem to do so.  163 
Ramsey’s doubts do not extend to a second type of representational posits, 164 
which he calls S-representations (“S” for “simulation” or “structure”) and takes to 165 
be robustly representational. The basic idea behind S-representation is that of an 166 
isomorphic correspondence between two systems, X and Y (Palmer, 1978; Swoyer, 167 
1991). X functions as a representation of Y if X and Y are isomorphic and provided 168 
X is used as a surrogate of Y during problem solving.1 The entity that engages in 169 
problem solving attempts could be a person, an animal, or a machine. Although 170 
Ramsey does not say so, the proviso about using X allows him to deflect an 171 
obvious objection to the notion of representation as isomorphism, namely that 172 
isomorphisms are symmetrical (if X is isomorphic to Y, then Y is isomorphic to X) 173 
whereas representation is not (a picture can represent a rabbit, but the rabbit does 174 
not thereby represent its picture). This proviso is also absolutely necessary from 175 
Ramsey’s perspective because no formal aspect of X, in and by itself, could make 176 
it into a representation. Remember the driftwood that looks like a map; it does not 177 
qualify as a representation unless it is used as such. 178 
Ramsey’s concept of S-representation thus coincides largely with Gallistel’s 179 
definition of representation as a functioning isomorphism (Gallistel, 1993, p. 30). 180 
Ramsey refers to S-representations, or parts thereof, as “elements of a model or 181 
simulation” (p. 87) and describes the accompanying process as “surrogative 182 
reasoning” (p. 83). The cognitive system that solves a problem successfully by 183 
employing S-representations succeeds precisely because the S-representations are 184 
isomorphic to aspects of the problem-solving domain (p. 85). The nature of the 185 
problem being solved also fixes the content of the S-representation. When a rat 186 
orients itself in a maze by using an S-representation of it, the S-representation may 187 
be isomorphic to all sorts of things beyond the structure of the maze. (This 188 
multiplicity of isomorphs is the basis of a standard objection to the theory of 189 
representation as isomorphism. Objectors assert that on the isomorphic conception, 190 
representational content is underdetermined.) On Ramsey’s conception, however, 191 
the rat’s S-representation represents the maze, and the maze only, because as a 192 
matter of fact this is the maze that the animal negotiates (p. 95). Finally, the notion 193 
of S-representation allows Ramsey to meet the main challenge that he has himself 194 
identified: explaining how an entity that is only part of a cognitive agent could 195 
function as a representation. As he states: 196 
It should be clear how, on this conception, brain states that are posited as part of 197 
a computational process (brain states that function as data structures) actually 198 
serve as representations in such a process. They do so by serving as constituent 199 
elements of a model or simulation that is exploited by the system when doing 200 
some cognitive task. (p. 87) 201 
                                                 
1 Here the correspondence between X and Y is supposed to be bijective, but this condition 
can be relaxed and the concept of isomorphism replaced by that of homomorphism 
(Swoyer, 1991). In this article I will stick to isomorphisms for simplicity. 
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Both IO- and S-representations are fundamental posits of what Ramsey calls 202 
“the classical computational theory of cognition” (CCTC, p. 2), and they fulfill his 203 
requirements for a coherent philosophical conception of representation. There are 204 
two other notions of representation, however, that fail to so. These notions are 205 
those of receptor and tacit representation. They figure prominently in neuroscience, 206 
connectionism, and other approaches that depart from CCTC.  207 
The basic idea behind the receptor notion of representation is that an internal 208 
change X qualifies as a representation of some feature or entity Y whenever X 209 
responds reliably to Y. It is in this sense that a cell or group of cells in the brain is 210 
said to “represent,” “signal,” or “carry information” about Y. In all cases, what 211 
grounds the representational role of X is the causal or nomic dependency relation 212 
between Y and X. Now, an obvious shortcoming of this notion of representation is 213 
its overgenerality. In a sufficiently loose sense of “information,” any physical 214 
effect may be said to “represent” or “carry information” about its causes. However, 215 
the receptor notion of representation can be strengthened by appealing to natural 216 
selection and requiring of X to have been conserved across generations for being a 217 
causal mediator between Y and behavior. To qualify as a representation of Y, then, 218 
not only must X reliably respond to Y, but it must be its biological function to do 219 
so (Dretske, 1988). 220 
Against this approach to representation, Ramsey objects that receptors, even 221 
receptors that have been selected for, fail to play a representational role. For 222 
example, the firing pin in a gun mediates causally between pulling the trigger and 223 
the gun’s firing, and its presence in the gun is certainly no accident. In fact, guns 224 
are carefully designed so as to incorporate a firing pin. Yet a firing pin does not 225 
represent anything (p. 136). Another counterexample to the receptor notion 226 
involves Ramsey planting a tree in his backyard so as to profit from the shade. The 227 
length of the tree’s shadow is causally related to the position of the sun, and the 228 
tree has been planted in the yard because of this causal relation. Yet in this case, 229 
the shadow does not represent anything. The problem is that the tree’s shadow is 230 
not used as a representation—only as a shade. 231 
The last notion of representation, that of tacit representation, similarly fails. 232 
Although not entirely absent from CCTC, this notion has been invoked mainly by 233 
connectionist modelers, who argue that their networks exhibit some form of “tacit 234 
representation” or “tacit knowledge.” The ground for this attribution is that the 235 
system being modeled exhibits appropriate behavior in response to input patterns. 236 
Thus, a connectionist network may be said to represent some categories implicitly 237 
if presenting category members as input leads to differential output that respects 238 
the category boundaries. Against this approach to representation, Ramsey notes 239 
that “tacit representation” does nothing more than to describe a change of 240 
dispositions or input–output relations, and that on this ground everything is a 241 
representation. Copy machines know how to collate papers, and vases represent the 242 
fact that they break if hit hard enough. A concept of representation with this degree 243 
of generality is scientifically vacuous (p. 177). 244 
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Representation and Behaviorism 245 
Although Ramsey distinguishes bona fide representations from receptors and 246 
tacit dispositions, he does so for the purpose of philosophical clarification and 247 
refrains from adjudging their relative empirical merits. Nowhere does he argue, for 248 
example, that S-representations are scientifically preferable to connectionist or 249 
dynamicist models. He does comment, however, on the fate of representational 250 
concepts, ersatz or genuine, in cognitive science. The last thirty years have seen an 251 
increasing prevalence of connectionist and neuroscientific research that relies on 252 
the notions of receptor and tacit representation. Because these notions, according 253 
to Ramsey, are not really representational, he suggests that cognitive science is in 254 
part moving back to behaviorism.  255 
Whether Ramsey’s verdict of a “revolution in reverse” (p. 223) is correct, 256 
however, depends at the very least on what one means by “behaviorism.” It is true, 257 
as Ramsey reminds his readers, that the behaviorists never denied the existence of 258 
the nervous system, and that some forms of behaviorism have made room for 259 
proximal determinants of behavior in the guise of S-R mediators (Hull, 1930) and 260 
private events (Skinner, 1976). In fact, Hull (1930) once appealed explicitly to 261 
structured representations: 262 
Sequences in the outer world evoke parallel reaction sequences in sensitive 263 
organisms. By the principle of redintegration the organismic sequences acquire a 264 
tendency to run off by themselves, independently of the original world 265 
sequences. The organism has thus acquired an intimate functional copy of the 266 
world sequence, which is a kind of knowledge. (p. 523) 267 
Here the “intimate functional copy” that Hull postulates is isomorphic to a 268 
portion of the environment (in the sense of preserving ordering relations in time) 269 
and supports the animal’s problem-solving efforts. Hence it fully qualifies as an S-270 
representation. (Ramsey denies this, p. 225, but on grounds that are unclear to me.)  271 
Now, Ramsey is not the first to note the similarity of an important portion of 272 
cognitive science and mediational behaviorism (e.g., Moore, 1982). In either case, 273 
behavior is explained through internal processes described mainly in the language 274 
of causal mediation and neural networks. However, there is another version of 275 
behaviorism, a nonmediational one that is definitely present (although to different 276 
degrees and not always consistently) in Kantor, Skinner, and Gibson. In contrast to 277 
Hullian theory and its sequels, nonmediational behaviorism emphasizes the 278 
transdermal nature of each psychological event and its historical explanation 279 
through past interactions with the environment. A shift from S-representations to 280 
neurally inspired networks is not a return to nonmediational behaviorism, but a 281 
switch from one version of mediational behaviorism to another (Malone, 1990).  282 
What would nonmediational behaviorists think of Ramsey’s attempts at 283 
clarifying the concept of representation? On the one hand, the scientific 284 
characterization of the neural machinery behind behavior is part of another 285 
discipline with its own subject matter (Smith, 1994). To the extent that it deals with 286 
neural events, the choice between S-representations and receptor notions of 287 
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representation is irrelevant to nonmediational behaviorism. On the other hand, the 288 
concept of internal representation is a cornerstone of mentalism, which promotes 289 
itself as a competitor to environmental explanations of behavior (e.g., Fodor, 1975). 290 
Nonmediational behaviorists may therefore sympathize with Ramsey’s 291 
clarification attempts and with his criticism of the cognitivist overuse of 292 
representational concepts. But can the concept of representation be clarified and 293 
retain any scientific validity? 294 
The Trouble with Representation 295 
As Ramsey notes, representational explanations in cognitive science are 296 
riddled with confusion. They are also remarkable for the ubiquity and certainty 297 
with which they are invoked to explain all but the simplest unconditional reflexes 298 
(e.g., Roitblat, 1982). Attributing complex behavior to representations is what 299 
Branch (1986) has called a cognitivist’s “must.” Ramsey finds the unclarity of 300 
representational attributions embarrassing (p. 221), but more than the unclarity, it 301 
is the unusual confidence with which such attributions are made that should worry 302 
him. This confidence is not a sign of good science. Data always have more than 303 
one possible explanation, and certainty in physical and biological sciences (“there 304 
must be a magnetic field around the earth”) it is the end result of a lengthy 305 
selection process through which the currently accepted theory survived empirical 306 
testing as well as challenges from competitors. In cognitive psychology, however, 307 
representational attributions are not the result of, but the prerequisite for, 308 
theoretical development. Representations are invoked even before the theory starts. 309 
Finally, cognitive psychologists do not propose that some brain processes are 310 
merely analogous to representations—in which case we could discuss sensibly in 311 
what respects the analogy holds and in what respects it does not. Rather, cognitive 312 
psychologists propose that some brain processes literally are representations.  313 
This unique mix of obscurity, ubiquity, certainty, and literality needs to be 314 
explained. Clearly, representational concepts are not invoked for mundane 315 
scientific reasons. These concepts instead reflect deeply held prescientific 316 
commitments that arose in specific historical circumstances. “Representation” 317 
comes through the Old French from the Latin idioms of “repraesentatio” and 318 
“repraesentare,” meaning, variously, payment, illustration, or bringing something 319 
to the mind (Lagerlund, 2007). From the twelfth century onward, the concept of 320 
representation was deployed more systematically in relation with sensation, 321 
imagination, and memory. Later authors also connected the concept of 322 
representation with signs and linguistic symbols. Thus, the application of 323 
representational concepts to the brain (as is now commonly the case in cognitive 324 
science) does not express a direct analogy from one research domain to another, 325 
but an indirect one via a substantive theory of the soul or mind (Lagerlund, 2007). 326 
Medieval philosophical concepts about the mind have been transposed to the brain 327 
through the explicit identification of the former with the latter (e.g., “the mind is 328 
what the brain does”; Pinker, 1997, p. 21). 329 
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It is this commitment to a philosophical stance, not any particular aspect of 330 
the data, that explains the strength of conviction, in some quarters, that 331 
psychological explanation must be representational. In this sense, van Gelder 332 
(1995) was certainly correct when he pointed out how classical cognitive science 333 
embodied the Cartesian view of the mind as a representational engine. Taking 334 
representational descriptions of the brain to be literally true, instead of merely 335 
analogical, also legitimizes Ramsey’s strategy of judging representational posits in 336 
terms of their correspondence, or lack thereof, to what one would ordinarily call a 337 
representation. Unfortunately, although aware of the difficulty of taking the notion 338 
of mental representation literally (p. 221), Ramsey fails to realize how doomed 339 
representationalism actually is. 340 
Remember the crucial ingredient of representation, according to Ramsey, the 341 
defining element that makes of an entity a representation. An entity X qualifies as a 342 
representation if and only if it used as a representation. Ramsey, however, is never 343 
entirely clear on what this use is supposed to consist of. Ordinary representation is 344 
rooted in a set of social practices and contexts, as when someone uses X to 345 
represent Y as being such and such (van Fraassen, 2008). It would be absurd to 346 
suppose that these social factors are present in the case of neural states, and 347 
Ramsey wisely avoids doing so. If social practices are needed to make of an entity 348 
X a representation, however, Ramsey should conclude that there are no 349 
representations in the brain and that there cannot be any. As we have seen, he 350 
distinguishes mere causal relays from isomorphs of the environment and argues 351 
that only the latter fulfill a representational rule. But that an entity X is isomorphic 352 
to some environmental structure Y is no substitute for X being used (socially?) as a 353 
representation of Y. By Ramsey’s own analysis, it is usage, not isomorphism, that 354 
makes of an entity a representation (Sprevak, 2011). Just as there are non-355 
isomorphs that can be used as representations, and therefore are representations (as 356 
when white smoke is used to announce the election of the pope), some isomorphs 357 
fail to be used as representations and therefore are not representations (recall the 358 
example of the logwood on the beach).2 An analysis of representation in terms of 359 
isomorphism necessarily fails. 360 
Could Ramsey strengthen his analysis by adding to the isomorphism between 361 
X and Y some extra condition that would confer a representational role on X 362 
without invoking social practices? At times Ramsey suggests that an isomorph 363 
qualifies as a representation provided it supports “learning” (p. 141), “reasoning” 364 
                                                 
2 Strictly speaking, it is a mistake to refer to a set of causal relays, such as the different 
types of smokes B and D used during the papal conclave, as nonisomorphic to the set of its 
causes. Imagine, for example, that A causes B and that C causes D. A being different from 
C and B being different from D, the structures <{A, C}, difference> and <{B, D}, 
difference> will be isomorphic to each other. The isomorphism in question, however, 
involves no other relation or property than the difference between two events and can be 
considered trivial. When Ramsey distinguishes isomorphs from mere causal relays, he 
obviously restricts the concept of isomorphism to nontrivial isomorphs that involve more 
than identify and difference; for example, isomorphs that preserve metric relations. Also 
see Gallistel, 1993, p. 27. 
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(p. 83), or the drawing of “inferences” (p. 79). But absent a noncircular definition 365 
of these concepts, they will provide little help in deciding whether an entity is or is 366 
not used as a representation. The problem is especially acute considering the range 367 
of cases that Ramsey discusses in representational terms—for example, a car that 368 
would negociate an S-shaped circuit by tuning the orientation of its wheels to an 369 
internal miniature shaped as an S (p. 199). By tracking the shape of the miniature, 370 
the car avoids bumping into barriers. We can even explain its success by pointing 371 
out that the internal miniature is a literal isomorph of the circuit. Contrary to 372 
Ramsey, however, the car does not seem to engage in “learning” or “reasoning” at 373 
all. At best the car may be said to engage in problem solving. But reliance on an 374 
isomorph, even a highly successful one, in solving a problem is not enough to turn 375 
this isomorph into a representation. Assume that I am facing the door of my new 376 
apartment. The landlord has given me a bunch of keys, but I do not know which 377 
one opens the door. By trying the keys one after the other, I eventually find the 378 
correct one. The key I use to open the door is isomorphic to the lock; I use this 379 
isomorph to open the door; and my success at opening the door is due to the 380 
isomorphism between the key and the lock. Yet my key is no more a representation 381 
than the firing pin in a gun or the shade in Ramsey’s backyard are representations. 382 
Ramsey argues that those who attribute a representational role to causal relays 383 
do so incorrectly, by analogy with examples in which causal relays are actually 384 
used as representations: 385 
It is plausible to assume that the receptor notion in cognitive science is derived 386 
from our use of receptor-like structures that exist in the external world. We use 387 
things that reliably respond to something else to make accurate inferences about 388 
various things in the world. The rising mercury in a thermometer literally 389 
informs us that the temperature is rising. (p. 218) 390 
By ascribing a representational role to the S-shaped miniature inside the car, 391 
however, Ramsey seems to be committing the very same mistake he is arguing 392 
against in the case of causal relays. We use isomorphs, just as we use causal relays, 393 
to make inferences about things in the world. But the car is no more a user of 394 
representations than I am when I open my door with a key isomorphic to its lock. 395 
To understand what could make a representation of an S-shaped miniature, 396 
remember that making or using a representation involves two domains, X and Y, 397 
each with its distinctive features. Now, there is no way we coud use elements of X 398 
to represent elements of Y if we knew nothing of the latter independently of our 399 
representational use of X. If we knew nothing about temperatures independently of 400 
thermometers, reading the latter could never “inform us that the temperature is 401 
rising.” And people must have known a good deal about temperatures before 402 
starting to use thermometer readings as representations of the current temperature. 403 
Similarly, the person who uses the map of a terrain as a representation of angles 404 
and distances must know what angles and distances are independently of any 405 
map—otherwise there is no way the map could function as a representation. This is 406 
the essence of the quote by Nunn (1909-1910) that starts my review, and this, 407 
among other things, is what Ramsey’s example of the car with the S-shaped 408 
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miniature misses. Ramsey’s car never knows anything about the S-shaped circuit, 409 
even when tracing its curve perfectly. The car does not even have sensors that 410 
would allow it to know about the shape of any circuit. Whether the car “knows” its 411 
internal miniature is debatable, but in any event, the car cannot employ this 412 
miniature as a representation of a circuit because the car never knows anything 413 
about circuits.  414 
What about a concept of representation such as Gallistel’s (1993), in which 415 
internal isomorphs of stimulus variables mediate causal relations between 416 
environment and behavior? This alternative conception of representation fails just 417 
as Ramsey’s example of the car does, although for slightly different reasons. In 418 
Gallistel’s conception, animals never know anything about the environment except 419 
through internal mediators that are isomorphic to their causes. As we have seen, an 420 
animal would have to know something about the environment (Y) independently of 421 
its isomorphic effects (X) to use the latter as representation of the former. But this 422 
will never happen, since on Gallistel’s conception the only way the animal can 423 
know about Y, if at all, is through X. An internal mediator isomorphic to its 424 
environmental causes is no more a representation than a key or a lock is, regardless 425 
of the usefulness of the isomorph or its fine tuning through natural selection 426 
(Gallistel, 1993, p. 31). Keys are functioning isomorphs and are fine tuned to the 427 
corresponding lock, but they are not representations—unless a locksmith or an 428 
artist who knows about keys and locks decides to use the former as representations 429 
of the latter.  430 
Conclusion 431 
Representation Reconsidered is a good book, and I recommend its reading to 432 
anyone interested in theoretical debates about the explanation of behavior. In 433 
particular, I hope that Ramsey’s work will increase awareness of the widespread 434 
abuse of representational notions in cognitive science (Hutto, 2011). Ramsey 435 
correctly criticizes the tendency, which he calls “silly,” to ascribe representation to 436 
entities as diverse as bacteria, viruses, collating copy machines, and glass vases (p. 437 
11, p. 170, p. 177) on no more ground than linguistic license.  438 
I do not believe, however, that Ramsey correctly identifies the minimal 439 
grounds for making a representation of an entity X. Employing X as a 440 
representation of Y implies, at the very least, knowledge of Y beyond X and 441 
independently of X (Nunn, 1909-1910). Causally and behaviorally speaking, when 442 
X is used as a representation of Y, the effects of X must depend on separate 443 
exposure to at least some of the features exemplified by Y. It is the latter that give 444 
historical grounding to the eventual effects of X on behavior (Tonneau, 2007). This 445 
minimal causal structure is absent from all the alleged cases of representation that 446 
Ramsey discusses.  447 
Because there is no shared causal structure between actual examples of 448 
representation and the putative cases (whether conceived as causal mediators, 449 
isomorphs, or dispositions) discussed by cognitive scientists, the notion of internal 450 
representation should be rejected. Neural processes may well be analogous, in 451 
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some superficial respect, to some representations (cf. Gentner & Jeziorski, 1993), 452 
but the fact remains that they are not representations. Whenever behavior is 453 
explained by appealing to an internal isomorph of the environment, what does the 454 
explanatory job is the notion of isomorphism and not that of representation. 455 
Remember that these two notions are entirely distinct. As we have seen, some 456 
isomorphs, even functioning isomorphs, are not representations. Conversely, 457 
beyond the trivial isomorphism mentioned in Footnote 2, some representations are 458 
not isomorphic to what they represent (van Fraassen, 2008). Insisting on calling a 459 
neural isomorph a “representation” amounts to projecting agency and intentionality 460 
on a biological phenomenon to which they do not belong.  461 
When applied to perception and, in particular, to consciousness, the concept 462 
of representation has had even more disastrous effects. It has convinced people that 463 
they are conscious, not of the environment itself, but of covert surrogates hidden 464 
somewhere inside the brain (Tonneau, 2011). The end result has been to turn the 465 
nature of conscious contents into an incomprehensible neurological mystery. 466 
Dennett (1995) thinks that evolution by natural selection is the “single best idea 467 
anyone has ever had” (p. 21). I have no particular candidate for humanity’s best 468 
idea, but I do think I know which is the worst idea anyone has ever had. This idea 469 
is that of mental representation. Representation should not be reconsidered. It 470 
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